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ABSTRACT 
An effective Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) defense 
mechanism must guarantee legitimate users access to an In-
ternet service masking the effects of possible attacks. That 
is, i t must be able to detect threats and discard malicious 
packets in a online fashion. Given that emerging data 
streaming technology can enable such mitigation in an ef-
fective manner, in this paper we present STONE, a stream-
based DDoS defense framework, which integrates anomaly-
based DDoS detection and mitigation with scalable data 
streaming technology. 
With STONE, the traffic of potential targets is analyzed 
via continuous data streaming queries maintaining informa-
tion used for both attack detection and mitigation. STONE 
provides minimal degradation of legitimate users traffic dur-
ing DDoS attacks and i t also faces effectively flash crowds. 
Our preliminary evaluation based on an implemented proto-
type and conducted with real legitimate and malicious traffic 
traces shows that STONE is able to provide fast detection 
and precise mitigation of DDoS attacks leveraging scalable 
data streaming technology. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack in commu-
nication networks attempts to exhaust the computational 
resources of a server making its service unavailable to legit-
imate users. A typical attacking method is packet flooding, 
conducted sending thousands of packets per second to a tar-
get host to congest its network links. The high volume of 
illegitimate traffic is usually generated by controlling a col-
lection of compromised machines connected to the Internet 
(botnets). DDoS detection and mitigation techniques are 
challenging due to the vast and evolving range of big scale 
attacks. A successful defense mechanism must filter out ma-
licious traffic effectively, minimizing legitimate users service 
degradation. Furthermore, the filtering mechanism should 
stand constantly to react immediately to threats and should 
incur in a negligible latency overhead (especially when there 
are no attacks being perpetrated). We foresee that data 
streaming is the right paradigm to address the requirements 
of mitigation of DDoS attacks, especially, due to the recent 
advances in the field that have yielded elastic and scalable 
data streaming engines [6]. In this paper we leverage such 
elastic and scalable data streaming technology that enables 
the creation of continuous queries that constantly process 
incoming data and produce results in a real-time fashion, 
scaling as needed to deal with DDoS attacks. 
Prior work. 
In recent years the need for effective solutions against 
DDoS attacks has made i t an active and important research 
topic. Two main types of approaches exist for network intru-
sion detection [9]: 1) signature-based and 2) anomaly-based 
solutions. Signature-based solutions [13] check each incom-
ing packet to verify its signature and decide whether to for-
ward or discard i t . They have several limitations: not all the 
protocols can be signed and, for each new type of attack, a 
new type of signature may be necessary [11]. Contrary to 
signature-based ones, anomaly-based solutions, adopted in 
the context of threats where every malicious packet may 
seem legitimate if analyzed individually, attempt to cover 
a wider spectrum of attacks by spotting deviations between 
current and reference traffic behavior [9]. Plenty of anomaly-
based solutions provide detection or mitigation of multiple 
types of attacks relying on complex analysis of the traffic 
features [3, 11, 15]. The challenge lies in defining a traffic 
analysis that is amenable for on-line processing (solutions 
based on mining tools as [11] are best suited to study rather 
than detect threats) but accurate enough to properly miti-
gate attacks (solutions that simply look at the overall traffic 
volume [1 , 10, 14] provide no insights about what to discard 
during an attack). 
Our contribution. 
We present STONE, a stream-based DDoS defense frame-
work implemented on top of StreamCloud [5, 6], an elastic 
parallel-distributed Stream Processing Engine (SPE). With 
STONE, network traffic features are analyzed to both detect 
and mitigate threats. One of the novel features of STONE 
is its smooth shaping of a host’s traffic volume even in the 
presence of legitimate abrupt changes (i.e., during a flash 
crowd, STONE avoids the saturation of the protected host 
while prioritizing sources communicating frequently with i t ) . 
Filtering decisions are taken for groups rather than individ-
ual machines applying prefix level traffic aggregation. Thus, 
all the machines that belong to a small network whose traffic 
is legitimate will have equal chances of communicating with 
the protected host in the presence of attacks. We provide an 
evaluation of STONE conducted using data traces based on 
the network traffic data from CAIDA [7] and SUNET [16, 
12]. The results achieved by STONE prototype show quick 
detection and effective mitigation capabilities, thus making 
STONE a promising solution for mitigating DDoS attacks. 
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: 
1. STONE: an anomaly-based defense solution that pro-
vides both detection and mitigation of DDoS attacks. 
2. A novel traffic analysis approach based on data stream-
ing and implemented on top of StreamCloud, an elastic 
parallel-distributed SPE. 
3. An evaluation based on a real prototype and conducted 
using real legitimate and malicious traffic traces. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the system 
model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss 
the architecture of STONE. The evaluation is presented in 
Section 4. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
2. SYSTEM MODEL 
In this section, we introduce the network and stream model, 
we define the adversary model and state the problem STONE 
aims to solve. 
Network and Stream model . The network comprises 
four kinds of entities: (1) protected entities, network hosts 
that can be attacked; (2) legitimate hosts, end-hosts who 
consume protected entities services; (3) STONE machines, 
used to run STONE; and (4) bots, network hosts controlled 
by the attacker. The protected entities, legitimate hosts and 
the bots are connected via network links and routers, while 
STONE machines form a separated private network that 
cannot be reached by the attacker. Note that STONE can 
be used for protection of both single host and multiple hosts. 
I t can also be extended for deployment in the framework for 
traffic control and isolation against DDoS problem and pro-
tecting network resources [4]. Due to the space constraint, 
we do not address such issue in this paper. In the following, 
we study how STONE behaves considering only the traffic 
being sent to a specific protected entity. 
STONE defines two input data streams: network stream 
S and aggregated network stream Sa. S represents the flow 
of packets sent to a protected entity; each packet can be seen 
as a tuple (srcIP, bytes). Attributes srcIP and bytes repre-
sent the source IP address and the size of the packet, respec-
tively. Sa tuples contain aggregated information of S packets 
on a per-srcIP basis over periods of time and are composed 
by attributes (srcIP, tsA, tss, packets, bytes) (e.g., given pe-
riod 8:00:00-8:00:30, tuple (A, 8:00:12, 8:00:25, 5, 250) states 
that A sent 5 packets -250 bytes- starting from 8:00:12 to 
8:00:25). Stream Sa can be created from S using moni-
toring applications such as Cisco Netflow, which is widely 
supported by network devices or ISPs. 
In data streaming, incoming data (tuples) is processed 
on-the-fly by continuous queries, defined as directed acyclic 
graphs of operators. Results are computed over the most 
recent window of tuples (e.g., tuples received in the last 5 
minutes). Windows cover overlapping periods of size time, 
advance time units far from each other. For instance, a win-
dow of size and advance of 30 and 10 minutes, respectively, 
will cover periods [8:00:00-8:30:00), [8:10:00-8:40:00) and so 
on. 
Adversary model. STONE aims at defending against 
packet-flooding based DDoS attacks, e.g., SYN flood and 
UDP flood attacks. The adversary can use different types of 
packets in the attacks, such as TCP packets, UDP packets, 
ICMP packets, etc. However, we assume that the adver-
sary has no knowledge about the characteristics of the traf-
fic to the victim, such as distribution of source addresses, 
the number of flows and the rates of flows. In other words, 
the adversary can hardly launch an attack without dispro-
portional changes of the victim’s traffic features. With re-
spect to the reference information maintained by STONE, 
we assume that the attacker cannot modify nor pollute it. 
We stress that preventing the pollution of the reference in-
formation is orthogonal to the task of using it in order to 
detect attacks. 
Problem formulation. Given a protected entity and its 
maximum load L, the goal of STONE is to monitor its traf-
fic to (a) detect possible threats and (b) to shape its volume 
when it exceeds a threshold load o.L. Whenever filtering 
is applied, STONE must maximize the percentage of legiti-
mate traffic forwarded to the protected entity. As discussed 
in the introduction, STONE can be used to protect the host 
from real threats as well as legitimate peak loads (e.g., flash-
crowds). For this reason, we use the term legitimate traffic 
in a global way to refer to sources that are either frequently 
communicating with the victim host or that were communi-
cating with it before the attack or peak load started. That 
is, during a peak load, the legitimate traffic is the one gener-
ated by the usual clients of the host. The defense mechanism 
must ensure that the malicious IPs that reach the protected 
entity before detecting the attack have no way to exceed its 
maximum load. The challenge lies in which criteria to use to 
discard packets in S guaranteeing that the overall traffic vol-
ume does not exceed L while forwarding as much legitimate 
traffic as possible. 
The reason why STONE filters traffic only if it exceeds 
o.L is two-fold: on one hand, our solution is not intended to 
analyze the cause of the anomaly and does not distinguish 
between legitimate or illegitimate traffic spikes; on the other 
hand, forwarding potentially malicious traffic when o.L is not 
exceeded makes harder for the attacker to adapt the attack 
depending on how the system is reacting to it. 
3. STONE ARCHITECTURE 
In this section we present the components in charge of 
analyzing the protected host traffic in order to the detect 
possible threats and in charge of shaping its traffic volume 
when it exceeds o.L. 
Figure 1 shows STONE architecture. The Detection Con-
trol Center (DCC) is the subsystem in charge of detecting at-
tacks. It consumes Sa and compares its current features with 
the reference features maintained at the Historic Dataset 
(HD). The Mitigation Center (MC) is placed between the in-
coming stream S and the protected entity and takes care 
of filtering the traffic if it exceeds o.L. Its output stream 
Sm is equal to S whenever the incoming load is lower than 
o.L or a subset of S when filtering is applied. The filtering 
criterion is determined by the DCC. Whenever the traffic of 
the protected entity is below aL, the MC is not active and 
simply forwards S packets, resulting therefore in a negligible 
overhead for the protected entity. 
STONE 
Sa Detection Control Center 
(DCC) 
Historic 
Dataset (HD) 
Mitigation Center 
(MC) 
Figure 1: STONE architecture 
STONE computes traffic features aggregating together in-
formation of multiple IPs. More precisely, information is 
maintained for groups of source IPs, referred as source clus-
ters (srcCL), sharing the same prefix of b bits of the IP 
addresses. The reason why features are not maintained on a 
per-srcIP basis is threefold: (a) the huge number of IPs con-
necting to an entity might render the protocol impractical, 
(b) the traffic exchanged by individual IPs might be negli-
gible with respect to the overall traffic, making thus com-
parison between current and reference features not reliable 
and (c) decisions taken for source clusters (i.e., physically 
close machines for small source clusters) allow for smoother 
mitigation (e.g., forwarding traffic from all the nodes of a 
legitimate network rather than only a subset of them). 
3.1 Detection Control Center (pec) 
The DCC is fed with the tuples of stream Sa. The fea-
tures of sources belonging to the same source cluster are 
aggregated together so that each source cluster i (srcCLi) 
is represented by features fi = ((f>i,c<Ji,Ti) , where <f>i repre-
sents the average number of packets per flow, coi represents 
the average amount of bytes per flow and n represents the 
average elapsed time per flow. We remark that, being based 
on temporal windows, this information refers to the most 
recent fraction of data. For instance, <f>i could represent the 
average number of packets per flow sent to the protected 
entity from srcCLi during the last hour. 
STONE analyzes how source clusters behave by parti-
tioning them into groups and studying how the frequency 
of each group evolves over time. Concretely, STONE splits 
the space into eight different groups {Go, • • • , GV} and main-
tains the number of source clusters belonging to each group. 
Source clusters are partitioned into groups comparing their 
features with the reference point O = (0^,0^,0T) (Fig-
ure 2). The reference point cannot be fixed as an absolute 
value but must be instead computed depending on the traf-
fic features of the entity being protected. For this reason, 
the reference point O is computed over past features (main-
tained at the HD) as the 0.95-quantile value of each feature. 
The 0.95 value is motivated by previous studies [8] stating 
that more than 90% of the traffic flows are mice flows with 
small number of packets. In our approach, source clusters 
sending mice flows to the protected entity belong to group 
Go (low number of packets and bytes sent during short pe-
riods of time), which includes most of the source clusters 
(95% x 95% x 95% ~ 85% of them if the three features are 
independent). 
fi = (0 i , 0Ji: Ti) 
> O^ < O^ 
< oTi \ > oT < oTi \ > oT < oT/ \ > oT 
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Figure 2: Group description 
STONE detects an anomaly if the difference between the 
reference frequency of each group and the current one is 
higher than a threshold parameter. The number of source 
clusters belonging to each group in the current traffic are re-
ferred as {no, • • • , nr} while the reference number of source 
clusters are referred as \no,...,nr}. STONE uses these 
counters to compute the current ratio per group 
Ti = ni/ ^-nj and the reference ratio ri = ni/ ^-rij. A 
traffic anomaly is detected if the distance between reference 
and current values exceeds a threshold tol, i.e., maxi \ri — 
?i\ > tol. 
The information maintained at the HD is used to com-
pute the reference point O and the reference ratios ro,... , r-j. 
These values are based on the traffic features observed over 
D intervals (e.g., Wednesday, 10:00:00-11:00:00) in the past. 
j ,d J 
(d) The reference ratio Ti is computed as *^2,dn\ f}2 
where n\ is the counter of group i at interval d. The ref-
erence point O is computed as the weighted 0.95-quantile 
of each feature of the source clusters communicating with 
the protected entity during the previous D intervals. Source 
clusters contribution to O is proportional to the number 
of times they appear during the reference period. For this 
purpose, we weight the contribution of each srcCLi in O 
defining Wi as the number of intervals in which it appears 
divided by the total number of intervals (which is D). The 
b 
features of srcCLi, referred as fi = (<f>i,Ui,Ti), are com-
puted as the average of the features observed over the last 
D intervals. For all srcCLi with weight Wi and average fea-
tures fi, the weighted 0.95-quantile of feature <f> (resp. co 
and T) is computed by ordering all the source clusters aver-
age feature {<fti}i (resp. {un}i and {Ti}i) and selecting the 
one with weighted position 0.95 ^.Wi. While monitoring 
the traffic of a protected entity, an anomaly is detected each 
time the distribution of the source clusters to groups changes 
abruptly; for instance, when a flooding-packet attack intro-
duces a large number of new source clusters. 
3.2 Mitigation Center (MC) 
MC is responsible for mitigating an attack to the protected 
entity filtering malicious traffic while minimizing the degra-
dation of the legitimate one. Figure 3 shows the sequence of 
steps taken to decide which packets to forward to the pro-
tected entity and which to discard. If the maximum load 
of the protected entity has not been exceeded and mitiga-
tion is not activated, packets are forwarded. If the traffic 
is being mitigated, the MC must ensure the maximum load 
L is not exceeded while prioritizing legitimate traffic. Fil-
tering of traffic belonging to group Go (i.e., mice flows) pri-
oritizes source clusters that were communicating with the 
protected entity just before detecting the threat. Due to 
the large number of source clusters that might belong to 
Go, its filtering relies on a Bloom Filter [2]. On the other 
hand, filtering of traffic belonging to groups G i , . . . , Gr (i.e., 
elephant flows) prioritizes source clusters that communicate 
frequently with the protected entity. In this case, filtering is 
applied on a per-source cluster basis, depending on the infor-
mation maintained in the Acquaintance-List (AL). Besides, 
packets forwarding decisions are taken partitioning the load 
into channels (one for each group), so that the proportion 
of load consumed by each group resembles the one observed 
processing only legitimate traffic. Packets that refer to un-
known source clusters (i.e., traffic that could be either from 
the attack or a flash crowd) are forwarded using a proba-
bilistic function that depends on the available capacity. 
J 
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Figure 3: Mitigation Center 
The Bloom-Filter (BF), used to filter packets sent by 
sources cluster belonging to group Go, is a space-efficient 
probabilistic data structure used to check the membership 
of elements in a set [2]. While BFs allow for new elements 
to be added to the set, removal of elements is not trivial. 
In STONE we improve the base BF defining a time-based 
BF where elements belonging to the set are associated to 
timestamps that specify when they have been added (time-
based BF have the same time and space complexity of the 
base one [2]). Doing this, STONE is able to maintain the 
source clusters belonging to group Go over periods of time 
(over the last 5 minutes in our mitigation mechanism). 
The Acquaintance-List AL is used to maintain the source 
clusters that belong to groups Gi , . .. , Gr. Each source clus-
ter is paired with a probability that specifies the proportion 
of the packets coming from each source cluster should be 
forwarded while mitigating an attack. Packets belonging 
to source clusters appearing to be frequently communicat-
ing with the protected entity will have a higher probability 
to be forwarded than the ones sent by source clusters that 
connect sporadically. 
It should be noticed that, either using the BF or the AL, 
we are still not guaranteeing that a single source cluster (or 
a group of them) whose traffic is being forwarded to the 
protected entity is unable to exceed its maximum load L. 
Although the attacker has no knowledge about the traffic of 
the protected entity, if a set of the source addresses overlaps 
with the ones maintained by the BF and the AL, we need a 
mechanism to ensure that the traffic of these sources will not 
saturate the capacity of the protected entity. For this reason, 
we assign to each group a fraction of the maximum load 
proportional with the one that each group usually injects. 
3.3 Parallel Data Stream Computation 
In this section, we present how STONE has been imple-
mented by means of a data streaming continuous query and 
how its execution is parallelized by the StreamCloud SPE. 
As shown in Figure 4, STONE’s query is defined by 7 
operators: OPi, . . . , OP6 compose the DCC while OP7 
composes the MC. For each operator input stream, Figure 
4 shows its tuples schema. In the following, we provide a 
short description of each operator. Operator OPi is used to 
compute the source cluster to which each tuple of Sa refers 
to. For each tuple t forwarded by OPi, OP2 outputs a tu-
ple containing the features of the source cluster maintained 
by OP2 before processing t (fold) and after updating them 
(fnew). Group G0id, representing the group to which the 
source cluster belongs based on fold, and group Gnew, rep-
resenting the one to which the source cluster belongs based 
on fnew, are computed by OP3 and, if G0u = Gnew, a tuple 
is sent to OP4 to update groups counters n0id and nnew. 
If Gold = NULL (i.e., the source cluster appears 
only counter nnew is updated. Similarly, If Gnew = NULL 
(i.e., the source cluster disappears from Gaid), only counter 
n0id is updated. Group counters are forwarded from OP4 to 
OP5 in order to compute observed ratios {fo,. .. ,rr}, which 
are subsequently forwarded to OP6 in order to be compared 
with the reference ones. Mitigation is invoked by OP6 each 
time maxi \n — r}\ > tol. When activated, OP7 is used to 
shape the protected entity traffic maximizing the forwarding 
of legitimate packets. 
We discuss now how the query execution is parallelized 
by StreamCloud, where each operator can be executed at 
an arbitrary number of STONE machines. On one hand, 
stateful operator OP2 (maintaining a window of tuples) is 
(srcl P: tSA: is B , packets, bytes) (srcGL:tSA: fold: fn&w) (tsA,n0, 
(srcCL, tSA, tsB , packets, bytes) 
OP1 
(srcCL, tSA, G0id, Gn e U j) 
OP2 
Compute 
source cluster 
Compute 
cluster features 
OP3 OP4 
OP7 
Filter 
traffic 
(srcIP, tSA: bytes) 
Compute 
groups changes 
Maintain 
groups counters 
(tsA, ^ 0 , • • • , ?V) 
OP5 OP6 
Compute 
ratios 
Compare 
ratios 
.egend: 
Centralized 
Operator 
Parallel 
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Figure 4 : Implementat ion as a continuous query 
parallelized using semantic-aware routing (i.e., tuples refer-
ring to the same source cluster are forwarded to the same 
machine). On the other hand, stateless operators OPi , OP3, 
OP4 and OP7 that do not maintain windows are parallelized 
using round-robin routing. In order to compute the current 
ratios, all the information maintained by OP4 nodes must 
be processed together; for this reason, operator OP5, and 
subsequently OP6, are centralized. 
4. EVALUATION 
In this section we provide an evaluation of STONE detec-
tion and mitigation capabilities. As aforementioned, an ef-
fective DDoS defense mechanism must detect attacks quickly 
and mitigate them minimizing the filtering impact on the le-
gitimate users. For this reason, we evaluate three metrics, 
namely, (1) detection time, the time elapsed between the at-
tack start and the attack detection, (2) mitigation precision, 
the quantification of the degradation of the legitimate user 
traffic and (3) traffic volume shaping, the quantification of 
how much traffic is discarded during the attack. 
Evaluation setup. The legitimate traffic is derived from 
real anonymized data traces from an OC-192 (10Gbits/s) 
backbone link of OptoSUNET [16]. The data traces are ex-
cerpts of the traffic happening on Thursdays (during 9 weeks 
in 2010) during the period 11:00-12:00. Tuples belonging to 
Sa are generated for intervals of 5 minutes. Among the des-
tination hosts that appeared in the data traces, we selected 
the one with higher traffic as the protected entity. The HD is 
populated using the features of the traffic in the first 8 days, 
while the last day trace is used as legitimate data trace. The 
attack data trace is taken from CAIDA [7] and contains ap-
proximately one hour of anonymized packets from a DDoS 
attack. The attack data trace has been mixed with the le-
gitimate data trace simulating an attack starting after 20 
minutes (1200 sec). In our evaluation we use a set of nodes 
equipped with a quad-core Xeon X3220@2.40GHz, 8GB of 
RAM and 1Gbit Ethernet. 
Detection time. A fast detection of an incoming DDoS 
attack is crucial for the mitigation effectiveness. Figure 5 
shows the maximum difference between the reference and 
current ratio (maxi \ri — ri\) for any group i during the pe-
riod of time when the attack is taking place. This difference 
increases rapidly when the attack starts. An anomaly is de-
tected if this maximum exceeds the tolerance. For instance, 
given a tolerance tol = 0.05, STONE detects the attack 
after 18 seconds. 
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Figure 5: Detect ion t ime 
Mi t iga t ion precision. This experiment studies how ef-
fective the BF and the AL are in preventing the forward-
ing of illegitimate traffic to the protected entity. In order 
to do this, upon detection of the injected attack (happen-
ing at second 1218 in the experiment), the system discards 
all the packets that do not belong to the BF or the AL. 
We first measure the precision with which the MC compo-
nent forwards legitimate traffic and discards illegitimate one. 
Figure 6 presents the percentage of legitimate traffic with 
respect to the overall legitimate traffic and the percentage 
of illegitimate traffic with respect to the overall illegitimate 
traffic forwarded to the protected entity. I t can be noticed 
that, during the attack, the percentage of legitimate traffic 
that is forwarded is around 90%. The illegitimate traffic is 
forwarded entirely to the protected entity before the attack 
detection, but once the mitigation is activated more than 
99% is discarded. 
Traffic volume shaping. Together with the mitiga-
tion precision evaluation, we now evaluate how effective the 
BF and the AL are when shaping the victim traffic volume 
(Figure 7). The load is expressed in KBit/second using a 
logarithmic scale for the y axis. The solid line represents 
the overall traffic load injected during the attack while the 
dashed line represents the output traffic forwarded by the 
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Figure 6: M i t iga t ion precision 
MC to the protected entity. While the mitigation is not ac­
tive, all the input traffic is forwarded to the protected entity. 
Once the attack is detected, most of the traffic ( 97%) is 
discarded by the BF and the AL. That is, the BF and the 
AL together are able to reduce drastically the amount of 
suspicious traffic, leading to an effective mitigation in the 
presence of legitimate load peaks (e.g., flash crowds). 
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Figure 7: Forwarded traff ic load 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have proposed STONE, an anomaly de­
tection DDoS defense framework that leverages data stream­
ing to attain the real-time requirements of this kind of ap­
plication. STONE detects packet-flooding attacks by main­
taining traffic features extracted by means of continuous 
data streaming queries that are also used to mitigate the 
attack masking it to the legitimate users. Our mitigation 
mechanism is also beneficial in the presence of flash crowds 
as i t can be used to prioritize usual clients while trying 
to distribute the remaining capacity among all the clients. 
The system has been implemented on top of StreamCloud, 
an elastic parallel-distributed SPE. Our evaluation shows 
STONE’s effectiveness both in terms of detection and miti­
gation. 
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